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Tactical Asset Allocation and 
 Presidential Elections 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze tactical asset allocation decisions around presidential elections using 
traditional methodology and then in the context of an efficient frontier analysis rather 
than the traditional stock-only or bond-only allocations in prior literature.  To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that addresses asset returns around 
presidential elections in a mean-variance efficient frontier framework.   We find that the 
efficient frontier is sensitive to presidential time periods, with Democrats providing the 
best risk-reward opportunities over the long term, while Republicans provide better 
opportunities over the past quarter century. 
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Tactical Asset Allocation and 
 Presidential Elections 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of tactical asset allocation (TAA) around calendar events—such as U.S. 
presidential elections—is a controversial issue in finance.1  At the heart of the matter is whether 
or not the capital market is efficient in the sense that security prices fully reflect the information 
content of known events.  If so, then calendar events, such as presidential elections, are irrelevant 
to current investment decision making because security prices already reflect the information 
content of any perceived patterns or cyclicality.  Conversely, if investors evaluate the investment 
consequences of calendar events in a somewhat inefficient market, or if the outcomes of 
presidential elections impact the returns on various asset classes, then a series of questions 
emerge that are relevant to tactical investing. 
Applied to U.S. presidential elections—a prominent four-year calendar event—these 
active investing questions are as follows: Are asset prices impacted by a four-year presidential 
election cycle?  If so, what are the effects on different asset classes (stocks, bonds, bills, etc.) 
according to the political party elected into office?  More importantly, as presidential elections 
come and go should investors depart from their long-term or strategic asset allocation to pursue a 
TAA posture?  Also, can the outcomes of presidential elections be forecasted and, if so, what are 
the factors that impact these outcomes? 
Our initial focus is on whether asset prices are impacted by the four-year presidential 
election calendar and whether asset returns vary by the political party in office.  If asset prices 
are related to presidential elections, then investors will want to consider information pertaining to 
election outcomes in making asset allocation decisions.  Tactical investing around a four-year 
Financial Services Forum  
5
election calendar would hold the possibility of earning superior returns (alpha).  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many investors follow expected election outcomes closely.  However, 
prior evidence on movements in asset prices around presidential elections is incomplete, 
provides mixed results, and is largely dated.  We provide evidence, contrary to earlier findings, 
that there is no statistically significant pattern in asset prices (with the exception of T-bills) 
around U.S. presidential elections over the past two decades.  Our findings also show that 
political party differences are statistically insignificant, although the raw average return 
difference on common stocks continues to favor the Democrats, albeit by a smaller margin.  
While Government bond and bill returns are higher under Republican administrations—
consistent with a historical pro-active stance against inflation—the only statistical difference 
during the 1981 to 2000 period is that T-bill returns remain significantly higher under 
Republican administrations. 
We then argue that the TAA decision around presidential elections should be addressed 
in the context of an efficient frontier analysis of portfolio opportunities rather than the traditional 
stock-only or bond-only allocations examined in prior literature.  To our knowledge, this is the 
first paper in the literature that addresses asset returns around presidential elections in a mean-
variance efficient frontier framework.  We find that the efficient frontier is sensitive to 
presidential time periods, with Democrats providing the best risk-reward opportunities over the 
long term, while Republicans provide better tradeoffs over the past quarter century when 
considering bond-stock allocations typical for diversified investors.  Moreover, when segmenting 
the value stock (style) premium by political party over the past quarter century, we find that 
Republicans provide a better risk-reward tradeoff over Democrats when looking at portfolios of 
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value stocks, bonds and bills.2  We also present a simple model that utilizes economic variables 
to forecast election results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the 
established literature on asset prices around U.S. presidential elections.  In Section 3, we present 
our empirical findings on broad asset classes including stocks, bonds, and bills.  In Section 4, we 
discuss the tactical asset allocation implications of our findings for broad asset classes. In 
Section 5, we consider the TAA implications of other return phenomena, particularly the value 
stock (style) premium segmented by four-year election periods.  In Section 6, we present a 
presidential election forecasting model.  A summary and conclusion, including some caveats, is 
then presented in Section 7. 
 
2. Asset Prices and Presidential Elections 
The notion that presidential elections and their outcomes may affect the economy and 
asset prices is not new.  Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) articulate the idea of a political 
business cycle based on the incentives for politicians to stimulate the economy prior to 
presidential elections.  Grier (1987) argues that Federal Reserve monetary policy is consistent 
with accommodating a political business cycle.  Allvine and O’Neill (1980) note that John F. 
Kennedy was the first president to pursue overtly and systematic policies aimed at controlling the 
level of aggregate economic activity.  Allvine and O’Neill also present evidence of a four-year 
cycle in the stock market during the post-war period and provide weak evidence that stock prices 
rise over the two years prior to a presidential election.  This effect is more pronounced in the 
latter period, 1961-1978 vs. 1948-1978, consistent with 1960 being the first year of a more 
actively managed economy.  Dobson and Dufrene (1993) examine the impact of U.S. 
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presidential elections on international security markets.  They find evidence of a significant 
structural change in the relation between international markets and the U.S. market around 
presidential elections.  International markets become more highly correlated with the S&P 500 in 
the month surrounding the election. 
The issue of which political party is “better” for investors has also been studied.  The 
results of these studies are mixed.  Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970) and Riley and 
Luksetich (1980) find that stock returns are higher around the time that a Republican is elected to 
office.  Expanding upon Allvine and O’Neill (1980), Huang (1985) presents evidence of a 
pattern in common stock returns over the four-year presidential election cycle and over different 
party administrations.  Looking at sub-periods from 1932 through 1980, he finds that returns 
during the last two years of a presidential cycle are higher than returns over the first two years.  
He finds that this effect is more pronounced for Democrats and, similar to Allvine and O’Neill 
(1980), it is more pronounced in the more recent period (1961-1980).  Stovall (1992) and 
Johnson and Chittenden (1999) also present evidence of higher returns during the last two years 
of a presidential election cycle.  Johnson and Chittenden (1999) also examine returns on broad 
asset classes from 1929-1996 in the years surrounding presidential elections and segment these 
results by political party.  They find that the returns on small-cap stocks are higher under 
Democratic administrations, while returns on bonds are higher under Republican administrations.  
These results hold for both nominal and real returns, as inflation is not significantly different 
under either party.  A recent study by Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004) finds higher T-bill 
returns under Republican administrations.  They argue that shifts in Federal Reserve monetary 
policy dominate political party and political gridlock in explaining stock and bond returns, 
although Fed policy may be related to political party. 
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3. Empirical Results—Broad Asset Classes 
Given the dated and disparate evidence on asset prices, presidential election cycles, and 
political party effects, we update and expand these prior results.  We first update the results of 
Huang (1985) on large-company stock returns.  We then extend the research of Johnson and 
Chittenden (1999) to consider the relation between political party and post-election returns for 
several broad asset classes, including large-company stocks, small-company stocks, long-term 
Government bonds, and Treasury bills, over various sub periods. 
 
Presidential Elections and Common Stock Returns 
Huang (1985) finds significant differences among the average annual returns on large-
company stocks over the four years of the presidential election cycle, and in the returns over 
years three and four versus years one and two, particularly for the 1961-1980 period.  He finds 
that these results are more pronounced under Democratic Party presidents.  We update these 
results for the 1981-2000 period and find no significant difference in returns on large-company 
stocks over years three and four versus years one and two of the presidential election cycle.  We 
also find no statistically significant differences in stock returns for Democratic versus 
Republican presidents, although the average return differential still favors the Democrats, albeit 
by a smaller margin.  These results are shown in Table 1. 
Financial Services Forum  
9
 
Table 1 
Mean Annual Rates of Return Around Presidential Elections 
 
Returns are for large-company stocks using Ibbotson Associates data.  1961-1980 analysis is per Huang 
(1985). 
 
Year of Election Cycle 1981-2000 (n = 20) 1961-1980 (n = 20) 
1 20.42% 1.80% 
2 13.32% -6.94% 
3 23.35% 23.35% 
4 8.94% 20.56% 
F-statistic 1.20 7.64*** 
   
Years 1 and 2 16.87% -2.57% 
Years 3 and 4 16.15% 21.95% 
t-statistic 0.11 4.70*** 
   
   
Party in Power 1981-2000 1961-1980 
   Democrat 18.21% 12.1% 
   Republican 15.37% 6.1% 
   t-statistic 0.43 0.77 
   
   Democrat   
      Years 1 and 2 18.31% 3.33% 
      Years 3 and 4 18.11% 20.87% 
      t-statistic 0.02 2.10** 
   
   Republican   
      Years 1 and 2 15.91% -11.42% 
      Years 3 and 4 14.84% 23.58% 
      t-statistic 0.14 2.10*** 
 
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
    * Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Huang finds average annual returns of 12.1% under Democratic administrations versus 
6.1% under Republicans, but the difference is not statistically significant.  He does find 
significant differences for Democrats of 3.33% versus 20.87% for post-election years one and 
two versus years three and four, respectively.  He also finds significant differences for 
Republicans of –11.42% versus 23.58% for post-election years one and two versus years three 
and four.  We find that these average return effects largely go away in the 1981-2000 period.  For 
example, average annual returns on large company stocks are 18.21% for Democrats and 15.37% 
for Republicans.  The average returns for Democrats are 18.31% versus 18.11% for post-election 
years one and two versus three and four, respectively, while these returns are 15.91% and 
14.84% for Republicans.  None of the return differences are statistically significant in the 1981-
2000 period.3 
 
Presidential Elections and Returns on Major Asset Classes 
We next examine the behavior of U.S. capital markets following presidential elections for 
the period 1929-2000, using data from Ibbotson Associates (2004).  We examine the returns on 
four asset classes (large-company stocks, small-company stocks, long-term U.S. Government 
bonds, and Treasury bills) for this period and for various sub periods.  We examine average 
annual returns for the four years following each presidential election and segment the results by 
political party.  The results are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Returns on Asset Classes Around Presidential Elections Segmented by Political Party 
 
Returns are average returns for four-year presidential election cycles, calculated using Ibbotson 
Associates data. 
 
 
 
Time Period 
Large-
Company 
Stocks 
Small-
Company 
Stocks 
Long-Term 
Government. 
Bonds 
 
 
T-Bills 
1929-2000 (n = 72)     
All 12.23% 17.13% 5.71% 3.88% 
Democrat 14.94% 25.53% 3.68% 2.79% 
Republican 8.85% 6.62% 8.25% 5.26% 
     
t-statistic 1.29 2.43** -2.06** -3.45*** 
     
     
1929-1960 (n = 32)     
All 11.15% 17.11% 3.15% 1.12% 
Democrat 15.35% 27.49% 3.22% 0.48% 
Republican 4.16% -0.20 3.04% 2.18% 
     
t-statistic 1.26 1.82* 0.09 -5.92*** 
     
     
1961-1980 (n = 20)     
All 9.69% 19.58% 2.78% 5.53% 
Democrat 12.1% 29.48% 0.04% 5.30% 
Republican 6.1% 4.73% 6.89% 5.89% 
     
t-statistic 0.77 1.87* -2.68** -0.54 
     
     
1981-2000 (n = 20)     
All 16.51% 14.72% 12.74% 6.66% 
Democrat 18.21% 14.73% 10.31% 4.79% 
Republican 15.37% 14.71% 14.37% 7.91% 
     
t-statistic -0.43 0.00 -0.65 -2.89*** 
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
    * Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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For the entire 1929-2000 period, the average annual return on large-company stocks was 
12.23%, averaging 14.94% during Democratic administrations and 8.85% during Republican 
administrations.  The difference is not statistically significant.  Small-company stocks averaged 
returns of 17.13% during this period, averaging 25.53% during Democratic administrations and 
6.62% under Republicans.  The small-company stock return difference is statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  In turn, the average returns on long-term Government bonds and T-bills were 
statistically higher under Republican administrations than under Democrats (8.25% vs. 3.68% for 
long-term Government bonds, and 5.26% vs. 2.79% for T-bills).  These empirical results are 
similar to those of Johnson and Chittenden (1999).4 
We also analyze the returns for three sub periods—1929-1960 (before the 
acknowledgement of active management of the economy around presidential elections); 1961-
1980 (a twenty-year period characterized by Allvine and O’Neill (1980) as the beginning of 
overt and systematic presidential policies aimed at controlling the level of aggregate economic 
activity, also analyzed by Huang (1985)); and 1981-2000 (the more recent twenty-year period, 
characterized by growth in an integrated global economy and a Fed Chairman whose term has 
spanned multiple party administrations).  From 1929-1960, returns on large- and small-company 
stocks are not statistically different under either party—although the average return differences 
are noticeably higher under Democratic administrations.  During this sub period, returns on long-
term Government bonds are statistically indistinguishable, while T-bill returns were higher under 
Republican administrations.  From 1961-1980, returns on large- and small-company stocks were 
also not statistically different under Democratic and Republican administrations, while returns on 
long-term Government bonds are statistically higher under Republican administrations, and T-
Bill return differences are statistically indistinguishable.  Again, the average return difference for 
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large- and small-company stocks is higher under Democratic administrations, although a 
narrowing of the gap is evident for large-company stocks.  For the more recent period, covering 
1981-2000, there is no statistical evidence of a political party effect on stock and bond returns.  
While large- and small-company average returns are higher under Democratic administrations 
(albeit, marginally so for small-company stocks), and long-term Government bond returns are 
higher under Republican administrations, the return differences are not statistically significant.5  
As with the 1929-1960 period, T-bill returns are significantly higher under Republican 
administrations. 
On balance, we find that the political party effect on common stocks reported in prior 
studies does not hold for the more recent 1981-2000 period.  Except for T-bills, the significant 
political party return differences reported by Huang (1985) and Johnson and Chittenden (1999) 
do not hold for varying sub periods, notably the 1981-2000 period.  The fading party effect may 
reflect an anomalous twenty-year period and long-run trends may reemerge in the future.  
However, the results for the recent period seem consistent with financial markets becoming more 
efficient over time with respect to this information.  Although conjecture, the results are 
consistent with the notion that in an integrated global economy there is less room for short-term 
manipulation of the economy for political purposes.  This is consistent with one Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, continuing to serve after seventeen years, four presidents, and two 
political parties.  The continuation of higher T-bill returns under Republican administrations is 
consistent with Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004).  Historically, Republicans are perceived as 
having a more pro-active stance against inflation, while Democrats pursue more expansionary 
monetary polices.  This effect has persisted in the recent period, despite the continuity of the Fed 
Chairman.6 
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4. Tactical Asset Allocation Implications 
Our finding that the impact of U.S. presidential elections on stock and bond prices has 
diminished over time and is no longer statistically significant should not be interpreted to mean 
that presidential election outcomes are a matter of indifference to investors.  Over the past two 
decades the average return on stocks (at least large cap stocks) is still higher (economically but 
not statistically) under Democratic than Republican administrations, while the average return on 
bonds and bills are higher under Republicans.  This latter finding gives some credence to the 
notion that active investors should increase their stock allocations (relative to bonds and bills) 
under Democratic administrations and increase their bond and bill allocations under Republican 
administrations. 
It is also important to emphasize that the judicious mix of stocks, bonds and bills in a 
portfolio, whether or not segmented by presidential election periods, is also impacted by risk and 
diversification considerations as measured by own volatilities and correlations.  From a portfolio 
management perspective, a more complete measure of whether Democrats or Republicans are 
actually better for investors requires an “efficient frontier” analysis of opportunities based on 
average returns, standard deviations, and correlations among asset classes.  In this regard, 
Figures 1 and 2 show two respective portfolio frontiers of stocks, bonds and bills based on long-
term return data over the 1926-2003 period and asset returns over the past quarter-century.  
Figure 2 spans two twelve-year periods of Democratic and Republican presidencies including 
James E. Carter (1977-1980)-William J. Clinton (1993-2000) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1988)-
George H. W. Bush (Bush I, 1989-1992). 
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Figure 1: Efficient Frontier: % Stocks/Gov Bonds/T-Bills:
Democrats (D) vs. Republicans (R)
 1926-2003
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Figure 2: Efficient Frontier: 12-Year Periods
Democrats (D) (Carter: Clinton) vs. Republicans (R) (Reagan: Bush I)
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Figure 1 reveals that the long-term risk-reward tradeoff is better under Democratic 
presidents than Republican presidents.  The portfolio frontier under Democrats dominates the 
Republican frontier everywhere except at a mix of about 35% stocks and 65% bonds and bills.  
While Republicans provide investors with positive long-term returns on stocks and bonds, the 
narrow spread between stock and bond returns results in somewhat lower diversification 
opportunities when compared to the risk management opportunities under Democrats.  To 
support this, Panel A of Table 3 shows that the historical correlation (1926-2003) between 
Government bond and large-company stock returns is 0.08 under Democratic administrations 
and 0.21 under Republican administrations.  In addition, the long-term correlation among 
Government bond and T-Bill returns is -0.02 under Democrats and 0.32 under Republicans.  
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With lower correlation in returns under Democrats, these ex post values point to somewhat better 
(arguably slightly) long-term diversification opportunities under Democratic administrations. 
 
Table 3 
 
Correlation in Asset Class Returns by Presidential Party 
 
Panel A and B correlations are based on returns on large-cap stocks, Government bonds, and T-Bills 
obtained from Ibbotson Associates (2004). Panel C correlations are based (in part) on returns on 
S&P/Barra large-cap value stocks obtained from www.barra.com. 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Historical Correlation in Stocks, Bonds, and Bills: 
  (1926-2003) 
 
    Large Cap Gov. Bonds T-Bills 
 
Democrat 
Large-cap stocks  1.0000   
Government bonds  0.0829  1.0000 
T-Bills    0.0614  -0.0244  1.0000 
 
Republican 
Large-cap stocks  1.0000 
Government bonds  0.2086  1.0000 
T-Bills    -0.0164  0.3180  1.0000 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Correlation in Stocks, Bonds, and Bills: 
  Carter (1977-1980)-Clinton (1992-2000) 
  Reagan (1981-1988)-Bush I (1989-1991) 
 
 
    Large Cap Gov. Bonds T-Bills 
 
Democrat 
Large-cap stocks  1.0000 
Government bonds  0.2028  1.0000 
T-Bills    0.2550  -0.2728  1.0000 
 
Republican 
Large-cap stocks  1.0000 
Government bonds  0.5977  1.0000 
T-Bills    -0.2653  0.0484  1.0000 
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Panel C:  Correlation in Value Stocks, Bonds, and Bills: 
  Carter (1977-1980)-Clinton (1992-2000) 
  Reagan (1981-1988)-Bush I (1989-1991) 
 
 
 
    Large Value Gov. Bonds T-Bills 
 
Democrat 
Large Value stocks  1.0000   
Government bonds  0.4971  1.0000 
T-Bills    0.2369  -0.2728  1.0000 
 
Republican 
Large-cap stocks  1.0000 
Government bonds  0.5304  1.0000 
T-Bills    -0.1816  0.0484  1.0000 
 
Figure 2 presents a noticeably different asset allocation picture by presidential years over 
the past quarter century; particularly, the two twelve-year periods covering Carter-Clinton and 
Reagan-Bush I.  While a stock-only portfolio provides better average returns under Democratic 
presidents, the Republican frontier dominates the Democrat frontier over a bond-stock allocation 
range that diversified investors might actually choose.  The figure shows that along the 40% to 
80% stock component of the Democrat frontier, the corresponding Republican mix of stocks, 
bonds, and bills provides a better risk-reward tradeoff.  Hence, when comparing portfolio 
frontiers under Democratic and Republican presidents over the past quarter century, we see that 
the Democrat frontier provides inferior opportunities, excepting at the extremes of risk tolerance 
such as 90-100% equities and less than 40% equities.  
The source of improved portfolio opportunities under Republicans over the past quarter 
century appears to be driven by the large average return difference, at 8.07% (14.37%-6.3%), on 
Government bonds under Republican versus Democratic administrations.  This has the effect of 
positioning the Republican frontier at a relatively higher starting point in the presence of a 
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relatively small spread between large company stock returns under Democrats versus 
Republicans.  However, Figure 2 shows that the Republican frontier is somewhat “flatter” than 
the Democrat frontier over the past quarter century. 
That a risk management disadvantage might exist under Republican presidents is 
supported in Panel B of Table 3.  The panel shows a continuing lower correlation between asset 
returns on Government bonds and large-company stocks under Democrat presidents, at 0.20, 
versus a higher correlation under Republican presidents, at 0.60.  Moreover, the correlation 
between Government bond and T-Bill returns is still lower, at -0.27 and 0.05, under Democratic 
versus Republican presidencies.  Taken together, the portfolio frontiers segmented by the 
political party in office (Figures 1 and 2) are sensitive to both the time period and the party in 
office, making TAA by presidential parties a relevant consideration for active-minded investors. 
 
5. Empirical Results—Value Versus Growth 
To further investigate the opportunities for tactical asset allocation around U.S. 
presidential elections, we examine another return phenomena segmented by presidential party, 
notably, the value stock (style) premium.  In this context, it is well known (for examples, see 
Fama-French (1992) and Grant (1995)) that “value” stocks with high book-to-price ratio and/or 
high dividend yield have outperformed the low yield “growth” stocks over long periods of time.  
The portfolio style question that we investigate is whether the value stock premium is a 
phenomenon of Democratic or Republican administrations. 
The idea that value stocks might outperform growth stocks under Republican 
administrations is consistent with a public (or media) perception that Republicans cater to the 
financial needs of large- and well-established companies (often referred to as “Old Economy” 
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companies) while Democrats cater to large- and small-growth-oriented companies (so-called 
“New Economy” companies).  Moreover, if Republicans do provide better returns on bonds and 
bills, then companies having “fixed income” characteristics—such as high dividend-paying value 
stocks—would show relatively better performance than growth stocks under Republican 
administrations.  In turn, if Democrats are more pro-active on the growth side, then stocks of 
large- and small-growth companies would be expected to perform better under Democratic 
administrations. 
Again, the tactical asset allocation decision should be examined in the context of 
annualized returns (a reflection of wealth accumulation) and own volatilities and correlations.  In 
this context, Figure 3 presents two value-style portfolio frontiers, each based on twelve years of 
Democratic and Republican presidencies; specifically, Reagan-Bush I from 1981-1988 and 
1989-1992, and Carter-Clinton from 1977-1980 and 1993-2000. Each frontier is constructed 
using portfolio inputs (average returns, standard deviations and correlations) for value stocks, 
bonds, and bills over the past quarter century. 
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Figure 3: Efficient Frontier: 12-Year Periods
Democrats (D) (Carter: Clinton) vs. Republicans (R) (Reagan: Bush I)
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While the average return on value stocks is about the same for Democratic and 
Republican presidents, Figure 3 shows that a style-based mix of value stocks, bonds and bills 
favors the Republicans.  That is, over the past quarter century, the risk-reward tradeoff is 
everywhere better under Republican administrations than under Democratic ones; specifically, 
Reagan-Bush I versus Carter-Clinton.  Upon combining our asset allocation findings in recent 
decades, Figures 2 and 3, we see that recent Republican presidents have not only provided better 
portfolio tradeoffs in a range of stocks, bonds and bills that diversified investors might actually 
choose, but they have also provided better opportunities in a world where value “wins.”  
Again, the efficient frontier improvement under Republican administrations over the past 
quarter century seems driven by the large difference in average returns on Government bonds 
under Republican (Reagan-Bush I) versus Democratic presidencies (Carter-Clinton).  This risk 
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management qualification is reinforced in Panel C of Table 3 by the slightly higher correlation in 
asset returns for Government bonds and large-cap value stocks under Republicans and the higher 
correlation in Government bonds and T-Bills under Republican versus Democratic 
administrations that we noted earlier (Panel B of Table 3). 
Another consideration on the question of asset returns, presidential elections, and TAA is 
industry effects, which investors may interpret as a sub-classification of equity style.  That active 
investors should be concerned with industry-based considerations around presidential elections is 
supported by Kim (2004) and Knight (2004).  In this context, Knight finds that during the 2000 
election the stock prices of Bush II (George W. Bush)-favored firms and industries performed 
better than Gore-favored firms and industries when the probability of a Bush victory went up.  
For example, tobacco stocks went up during a prospective Bush victory (where probabilities 
were assessed from political futures prices on the Iowa electronic market7), while the stocks of 
Microsoft competitors and alternative energy sources went down.8  While further industry 
research is necessary, the alpha-generating results around U.S. presidential elections seem 
promising. 
 
6. Forecasting Presidential Elections 
 If an investor wants to re-allocate funds among asset classes around presidential election 
outcomes in the short-run, then it will be useful to forecast which party will be elected to office.  
Given that stocks have historically performed better during Democratic administrations 
(although insignificantly so in recent years) and bonds and bills have performed better under 
Republicans, an investor might want to choose a higher stock allocation under Democrats (lower 
bond and bill allocations) and vice versa for stocks and bond/bills under Republicans.  
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Additionally, investors may wish to employ TAA around value and growth strategies or other 
models of sector allocation, for example, those supported by Kim (2004) and Knight (2004).  
Such tactical departures from a long-term or strategic asset allocation make sense if the investor 
can in fact forecast presidential election outcomes with a measure of certainty. 
 While political pundits and media pollsters emphasize a sampling of voter 
perceptions of presidential candidates as helping to predict election outcomes, we examine the 
use of economic factors as potential predictors of presidential election outcomes.  To illustrate 
the potential of economic factors, we present the results of an ex post model of presidential 
election outcomes that relies on a consensus approach of three economic variables, namely, the 
CPI inflation rate, the misery index (sum of the CPI inflation rate and the civilian unemployment 
rate), and the four-year growth in real personal consumption.9 
Based on an ad hoc analysis of ex post factors, a turnover of the incumbent political party 
is predicted if: 1) the CPI inflation rate exceeds 4.5%, 2) the change in the misery index is 
greater than zero, or 3) the four-year real consumption growth is less than 11.75%.  A consensus 
prediction of the incumbent party getting reelected is obtained when at least two-out-of-three of 
the predictors yield a prediction of reelection.  Note that the model picks up the effect of inflation 
twice (once in the CPI inflation rate and again in the misery index) since most voters are 
impacted by inflation while the impact of unemployment is more narrowly confined. 
Fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l 
S
e
rv
ic
e
s 
Fo
ru
m
 
24
 
T
ab
le
 4
 
Pr
ed
ic
tin
g 
Pr
es
id
en
tia
l E
le
ct
io
n 
O
ut
co
m
es
 
 Ec
on
om
ic
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
pe
r R
en
sh
aw
 a
nd
 T
ra
ha
n 
(1
99
0)
 th
ro
ug
h 
19
60
 a
nd
 th
e 
Ec
on
om
ic
 R
ep
or
t o
f t
he
 P
re
si
de
nt
 (2
00
4)
 th
er
ea
fte
r. 
 T
he
 C
PI
 in
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
, M
is
er
y 
In
de
x 
(s
um
 o
f 
C
PI
 in
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
 a
nd
 c
iv
ili
an
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e)
, a
nd
 r
ea
l c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 a
re
 u
se
d 
as
 p
re
di
ct
or
s 
of
 e
le
ct
io
n 
ou
tc
om
es
.  
Th
e 
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
of
 I
nc
um
be
nt
 P
ar
ty
 E
le
ct
ed
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 a
 c
on
se
ns
us
 f
or
ec
as
t e
qu
al
 to
 y
es
 if
 a
t l
ea
st
 tw
o 
ou
t o
f 
th
re
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
to
rs
 
in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 th
e 
in
cu
m
be
nt
 p
ar
ty
 w
ill
 b
e 
re
el
ec
te
d.
  *
 D
en
ot
es
 a
 p
re
di
ct
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
in
cu
m
be
nt
 p
ar
ty
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
el
ec
te
d 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 a
 C
PI
 in
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
 o
f m
or
e 
th
an
 4
.5
%
, a
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
m
is
er
y 
in
de
x 
gr
ea
te
r t
ha
n 
ze
ro
, o
r a
 re
al
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 o
f l
es
s t
ha
n 
11
.5
%
. 
 
  
Y
ea
r 
C
iv
ili
an
 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
R
at
e 
C
PI
 
In
fla
tio
n 
R
at
e 
 
M
is
er
y 
In
de
x 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 
M
is
er
y 
In
de
x 
R
ea
l 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
In
cr
ea
se
 
 
Pr
es
id
en
t 
El
ec
te
d 
 
Pa
rty
 
El
ec
te
d 
In
cu
m
be
nt
 
Pa
rty
 
El
ec
te
d 
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
of
 
In
cu
m
be
nt
 
Pa
rty
 E
le
ct
ed
 
19
20
 
4.
0%
 
15
.2
%
*
19
.2
%
7.
6%
*
6.
7%
*
H
ar
di
ng
 
R
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
24
 
5.
5%
 
0.
3%
5.
8%
-1
3.
4%
29
.2
%
C
oo
lid
ge
 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
28
 
4.
4%
 
-1
.2
%
3.
2%
-2
.6
%
9.
8%
*
H
oo
ve
r 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
32
 
23
.6
%
 
-1
0.
2%
13
.4
%
10
.2
%
*
-1
1.
8%
*
R
oo
se
ve
lt 
D
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
36
 
16
.9
%
 
1.
0%
17
.9
%
4.
5%
*
20
.6
%
R
oo
se
ve
lt 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
40
 
14
.6
%
 
0.
8%
15
.4
%
-2
.5
%
13
.6
%
R
oo
se
ve
lt 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
44
 
1.
2%
 
1.
6%
2.
8%
-1
2.
6%
10
.8
%
*
R
oo
se
ve
lt 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
48
 
4.
0%
 
2.
7%
6.
7%
3.
9%
*
22
.4
%
Tr
um
an
 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
52
 
2.
7%
 
0.
9%
3.
6%
-3
.1
%
13
.1
%
Ei
se
nh
ow
er
 
R
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
19
56
 
4.
2%
 
2.
9%
7.
1%
3.
5%
*
16
.7
%
Ei
se
nh
ow
er
 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
60
 
6.
6%
 
1.
5%
8.
1%
1.
0%
*
11
.7
%
*
K
en
ne
dy
 
D
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
64
 
5.
2%
 
1.
0%
6.
2%
-1
.9
%
18
.2
%
Jo
hn
so
n 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
68
 
3.
6%
 
4.
7%
*
8.
3%
2.
1%
*
22
.4
%
N
ix
on
 
R
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
72
 
5.
6%
 
3.
4%
9.
0%
0.
7%
*
16
.9
%
N
ix
on
 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
76
 
7.
7%
 
4.
9%
*
12
.6
%
3.
6%
*
12
.4
%
C
ar
te
r 
D
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
80
 
7.
1%
 
12
.5
%
*
19
.6
%
7.
0%
*
11
.2
%
*
R
ea
ga
n 
R
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
84
 
7.
5%
 
3.
9%
11
.4
%
-8
.2
%
14
.5
%
R
ea
ga
n 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
88
 
5.
5%
 
4.
4%
9.
9%
-1
.5
%
17
.7
%
B
us
h 
I 
R
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
19
92
 
7.
5%
 
2.
9%
10
.4
%
0.
5%
*
8.
5%
*
C
lin
to
n 
D
 
N
o 
N
o 
19
96
 
5.
4%
 
3.
3%
8.
7%
-1
.7
%
13
.9
%
C
lin
to
n 
D
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
20
00
 
4.
0%
 
3.
4%
7.
4%
-1
.3
%
19
.9
%
B
us
h 
II
 
R
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Financial Services Forum  
Not surprisingly, the ex post model does a reasonable job of properly classifying U.S. 
presidential election outcomes.  The last two columns in Table 4 show whether or not the 
incumbent party was reelected and the consensus prediction of whether or not the incumbent 
party would be reelected.  A match in these two columns indicates that the ex post model makes 
the correct prediction, while a mismatch indicates that the model’s prediction is incorrect. 
The model errs in two of 21 elections.  In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower defeated incumbent-
party candidate Adlai Stevenson, even though all three economic predictor variables forecasted 
that the incumbent party would win the election.  In this case, the candidacy of a popular general 
from World War II prevailed over strong economic fundamentals registered by the incumbent 
party. The other case of an error in the model’s prediction was the presidential election in 2000, 
when George W. Bush narrowly defeated incumbent party candidate Al Gore.  Again, all three 
economic predictor variables were consistent with a victory by the incumbent-party candidate; in 
this case, Al Gore.  As is well known, the results of the 2000 presidential election were hotly 
contested, coming down to the court-challenged ballots in Florida and the case of the “hanging 
chads.” 
While the screens used in Table 4 were developed ad hoc, they seem consistent over 
time.  For example, the screens can be developed using data for the first half of the period 
studied (1920-1960) and then applied to the second half of the period.  The model correctly 
classifies all but one election in each of the two periods.  Additionally, the model was tested on 
the 2004 election using data available just prior to the election.  In October of 2004, the CPI 
inflation rate reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (bls.gov) was 
2.7%.  The unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was 5.4%, and the 
four-year real personal consumption growth (using the 2000-2003 increase reported by the U.S. 
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea.gov) adjusted to a four-year 
growth rate) was 14.13%.  The inflation rate of 2.7% was below the 4.5% cutoff for the inflation 
predictor, the misery index of 8.1% represented a 0.7% increase over 2000, and the four-year 
growth in real personal consumption of 14.13% was above the 11.75% cutoff for the 
consumption variable.  Inflation predicted a Republican victory in 2004, the misery index 
narrowly predicted a Republican defeat, and consumption growth predicted a Republican 
victory.  Thus, the model prediction in 2004 was for a Republican victory and the reelection of 
George W. Bush. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
We examine several questions related to tactical asset allocation (TAA) around a major 
calendar event—namely, U.S. presidential elections.  Contrary to earlier findings, we find no 
statistical evidence in recent decades of return patterns for major asset classes around 
presidential elections.  We also find little evidence of political party differences in U.S. post-
election returns, except for T-bills.  The fading variation in large- and small-company stock 
returns around election cycle and around political parties over the past two decades should be of 
interest to investors making TAA decisions on the basis of past relationships in asset prices. 
While several prior studies have examined returns on large stocks and other asset classes 
around presidential elections, none have utilized a mean-variance efficient frontier framework.  
We utilize a mean-variance  framework and find that the efficient frontier is sensitive to the time 
period, with Democrats providing the best long-term portfolio opportunities and Republicans 
providing better risk-reward opportunities over the past quarter century.  Moreover, active 
investors relying on past studies that emphasize the stock-only or bond-only mix might consider 
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adjusting their models to focus on equity style considerations, as value stocks (especially during 
Republican administrations) have largely outperformed growth stocks regardless of the political 
party in office.  When segmenting the value stock (style) premium over the past quarter century 
by political party, we find that Republicans provide a better risk-reward tradeoff over Democrats 
when looking at portfolio combinations of value stocks, bonds, and bills.  The results should be 
of interest to active investors relying on past relations between U.S. presidential elections and 
asset prices to make TAA decisions.   
As with most studies of past performance and relations in capital markets, these results 
and their implications to investors should be taken with some caveats.  It should first be noted 
that while the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 update prior literature using comparable 
methodology, these results are presented for relatively short sub-periods and may be driven by a 
small-sample bias.  Our results on efficient frontiers, shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, span different 
time periods and suggest shifting frontiers over different periods.  The data in Figures 2 and 3 
spans the past quarter-century, covering two Democratic administrations (Carter-Clinton) and 
two Republican administrations (Reagan-Bush I).  The efficient portfolio opportunities under 
Republican presidents seem largely due to the relatively high average returns on bonds and bills, 
giving the Republican frontier a higher starting point in return versus risk space.  Asset return 
correlations (large-company stocks and Government bonds and Government bonds and T-Bills) 
are generally lower under Democratic administrations, suggesting better diversification 
opportunities under Democratic presidents.  Given the differences between the longer-term and 
the more recent results, investors should be cautious when interpreting these results and 
projecting future results.  Finally, the model presented for forecasting election outcomes is an ad 
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hoc model.  While the cutoff points in the model appear to be fairly stable over time, and 
properly forecasted the 2004 election, these cutoffs may not be stable in the future. 
Going forward, investors should keep in mind the familiar the adage that past 
performance is not necessarily an indicator of future results—ex post efficient frontier analyses 
need not imply similarly-positioned ex ante return and risk management opportunities.  The 
future is, after all, the future.  This research points to some potential shifts in investment and risk 
management opportunities surrounding a well-followed and important calendar event—U.S. 
Presidential elections.  Future research opportunities include monitoring these return and 
portfolio effects over time and exploring further intricacies of TAA opportunities around 
presidential elections.  It may also be interesting to extend this analysis to other economies. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 Tactical asset allocation (TAA) is generally viewed as a temporary departure from a long-term 
or strategic asset allocation (SAA) mix of assets to take advantage of perceived market 
inefficiencies.  Since presidential elections, the focus of our study, are largely independent of 
investors’ long-term planning horizons, we employ TAA terminology when describing the asset 
allocation implications of the four-year presidential election calendar.  For a more institutional 
view of tactical versus strategic asset allocation, see Anson (2004).  He argues that strategic asset 
allocation is the domain of investment committees (pension funds, endowments, foundations) 
and is beta generating, while tactical asset allocation is the domain of investment managers and 
is alpha generating.  
 
2 In this paper, we employ traditional equity style labels for value and growth stocks.  However, 
we recognize that equity style is, in more fundamental terms, a reflection of sector and industry 
characteristics.  We are also aware of other equity style interpretations such as the economic 
profit (EVA) approach (Abate and Grant (2004)), which defines the “style” of a company by its 
fundamental ability to create wealth.  
 
3 Note that this twenty-year period includes the “Reagan Revolution” from 1981 to 1988 and the 
Clinton growth years from 1992 to 2000.  The abnormal growth in stock prices during the 
Reagan (Republican) and Clinton (Democrat) years is consistent with the robust economic profit 
(EVA) findings observed by Grant (2003).  He finds that during the Reagan and Clinton 
presidencies, the U.S. return on capital was largely higher than the U.S. cost of capital.  These 
economic-based stock market findings suggest that the past few decades (albeit, absent the stock 
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market “bubble” years of 1998-1999 followed by the downturn in 2000) were a “golden era” of 
investing, spanning both Republican and Democratic presidents. 
 
4 Johnson and Chittenden (1999) examine the 1929-1996 period, but do not examine any sub 
periods within this time.  
 
5 Since stock returns in Table 2 under Democratic presidents are generally higher than under 
Republican administrations, investors may prefer to distinguish between economic (or practical) 
significance and statistical significance when interpreting our findings; however, the lack of 
statistical significance suggests that these results may be due to chance.  That being said, Santa-
Clara and Valkanov (2003) examine the behavior of monthly returns from 1927 to 1998 and 
argue that the observed stock market premium under Democratic administrations cannot be 
explained by a business cycle risk premium or equity risk differential, thus resulting in a 
“presidential puzzle” as to why such an effect might occur. 
 
6 While our discussion proceeds as if the direction of causality runs from presidential election 
cycles (or the party in office) to asset returns, we note that returns around presidential elections 
may be impacted by other economic and monetary influences along the lines suggested by 
Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004).  We cannot be certain of the direction of causality, i.e., are 
higher T-Bill returns in Republican administrations a result of the new administration, or is the 
administration in power because of low interest rates (recession) before the previous election?  
We examine T-Bill returns under Democratic and Republican administrations (similar to Table 
2) but by lagged party, i.e., which party was in power prior to the election.  The results (available 
upon request) are generally consistent and weaker than the results reported in Table 2.  
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Additionally, we examine the differences in T-Bill returns segmented by whether or not the 
incumbent party was reelected, for both years subsequent to the election and lagged years.  The 
results (available upon request) again are generally weaker than the results reported in Table 2.  
T-Bill returns are slightly higher subsequent to elections when the incumbent party is not 
reelected for the 1929-2000 period, and are not significantly different for any sub-periods.  
Lagged returns are significantly higher when the incumbent party is not reelected for the 1929-
1960 and 1961-1980 periods and not significantly different for the other periods.  Taken 
together, the strongest differences in T-Bill returns are for Republicans over Democrats in the 
four years following elections, suggesting that Republican administrations generate higher 
returns on T-Bills.  We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional tests. 
 
7 It is interesting to note that in the 2004 presidential election, futures traders on the IOWA 
electronic market were largely anticipating a Bush II re-election victory.  The probability (futures 
price of $1 contract) of a Republican victory was noticeably higher than the probability of a 
Democratic victory, commencing in late August up to the November election, although the 
probability of a Kerry victory was increasing, but not by enough, before the November election 
(see www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem). While too recent and anecdotal, political futures prices on the 
IOWA electronic market (or like markets) may be a possible means of forecasting presidential 
election outcomes. 
 
8 As a more historical example, the Reagan Revolution (1981-1988) heralded a period of 
deregulation of industries, falling inflation, and rising business and consumer confidence.  The 
abnormal rise in stock prices that occurred during the Reagan tenure was joined with the 
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downsizing/restructuring of large industrial companies that constitute “Corporate America.”  In 
turn, the above-average return on stocks that occurred during the Clinton years (1992-2000) was 
associated with companies that benefited from deregulation of the financial services and 
telecommunications industries, along with new-age growth opportunities in the technology 
sector. 
 
9 This model was developed by Renshaw and Trahan (1990, 1991) and utilized by He, Renshaw, 
and Szelest (1998).  See also Fair (1996) for a review of utilizing economic models to forecast 
presidential elections. 
 
